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Preferences over consumption and leisure play no role in the standard optimal tax model, which attributes
all variation in earnings to differences in income-earning ability. We show how to incorporate these
preferences, which like ability are publicly unobservable, into the standard model in a tractable way.
In this more general model, the policy designer must guess at the relative importance of ability and
preferences in explaining variation in earnings. We show that such preferences could, in principle,
increase or decrease optimal redistribution. In the most plausible specifications of the model, however,
the result is clear: greater variation in preferences lowers the optimal extent of redistribution. To generate
more redistribution than in standard results, one must assume that the desire for income is inversely
related to income earned. This result holds even when the conventional model accurately describes
the average individual, and it suggests one potential resolution to the puzzle of why observed redistribution
is in some cases weaker than conventional theory would suggest. We then establish a new empirical
finding that confirms this model's central policy prediction across developed countries and U.S. states.
In countries and states with more heterogeneous tastes for consumption relative to leisure, redistribution
is statistically significantly lower.
Benjamin B. Lockwood











Individuals diﬀer in the value they place on consumption relative to leisure. These preference diﬀerences help
explain why some earn more than others, and they are a central part of popular and scholarly debates over
taxation. In this paper, we show that variation in these preferences may also help explain why the extent
of redistribution varies across countries and U.S. states, and why (at least in the case of the United States)
redistribution is weaker than conventional theory would suggest. More generally, we argue that neglecting
the role of preferences substantially impairs our understanding of both optimal and existing tax policy.
Surprisingly, such preference diﬀerences are absent from conventional optimal tax theory. That theory,
instead, attributes all variation in earnings to diﬀerences in income-earning ability. We generalize the conven-
tional model by allowing the tax designer to attribute observed variation in incomes to ability, preferences,
or a mixture of the two. The tax designer maximizes social welfare by choosing a universal grant and a
linear tax rate, a simpliﬁed tax system that provides us with a transparent measure of redistribution. We
use analysis of an illustrative version of this model and extensive numerical simulations of the full model to
characterize the eﬀects of preferences on redistribution.1
We derive novel, clear results from our generalized model. We show that variation in preferences can, in
principle, increase or decrease the optimal extent of redistribution. In the most plausible speciﬁcations of
the model, however, greater variation in preferences lowers optimal redistribution. To generate more redis-
tribution than in the conventional model, one would have to assume (counterintuitively) that the desire for
income is inversely related to income earned: i.e, that high earners have a lower marginal rate of substitution
of consumption for leisure than low earners at the same starting levels of consumption and leisure. We show
these results ﬁrst for a model in which preferences and ability are the same for all individuals with a given
income (as in the standard model). In that setting, attributing more of earnings variation to preferences
rather than ability lowers the optimal linear tax rate. Then, we show that if preferences and ability vary
conditional on income, preference heterogeneity is even more likely to reduce optimal redistribution relative
to standard results. In particular, suppose that the average individual with a given income has the same
proﬁle of preferences and ability as assumed in the conventional model. If other individuals with the same
income have diﬀerent proﬁles, then optimal redistribution falls.
The intuition for these results is that income is a worse signal of ability when preferences play a greater
role in driving earnings variation. Redistribution aimed at helping those with low ability will be less accurate:
some high earners will have low ability and some low earners will have high ability. A tax designer weighing
the distortionary costs of redistribution against its smaller beneﬁts will choose a lower optimal level.
These results suggest that the conventional Mirrleesian assumption is a special one that is, at least in this
way, likely to overstate the optimal extent of redistribution. We thereby provide one possible explanation
for the ﬁnding in Diamond and Saez (2011) that, based on the standard model, "Very high earnings should
be subject to rising marginal rates and higher rates than current U.S. policy for top earners."
Finally, we present a new empirical ﬁnding that suggests our model has descriptive, not just prescriptive
power. Using measures of redistribution and individuals’ responses to survey questions on how much they
value leisure and material goods, we conﬁrm a direct prediction of our model: more variance in reported pref-
erences is signiﬁcantly associated with less redistribution across both countries and U.S. states, conditional
on observed variation in incomes and the correlation of income with preferences. These results are robust
1We are focused on a diﬀerent type of preference variation than that which bears on the optimality of uniform commodity
taxation, as in, e.g., Saez (2002), Diamond and Spinnewijn (2011), and Golosov, Troshkin, Tsyvinski, and Weinzierl (2011).
2to controlling for a number of observable variables, including average income and ethnic fractionalization,
and they suggest a new aspect of the interpretation of the much-studied diﬀerences in redistribution across
countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 brieﬂy summarizes how this paper relates to the conventional
model’s treatment of preferences and to prior work on relaxing that approach. Section 2 describes a tractable
and ﬂexible way to include preferences in a generalized version of that conventional model. Section 3 stays
close to the standard model, limiting heterogeneity to one dimension but allowing the tax designer to interpret
that heterogeneity as a combination of preferences and ability. Section 4 considers the case with conditional
variation in preferences and ability. Section 5 contains our empirical analysis of the relationship between
preference heterogeneity and redistribution. Section 6 concludes.
1 T h i sa n a l y s i si nt h ec o n t e x to fp r i o rr e l a t e dw o r k
Heterogeneity in preferences was assumed away in the conventional optimal tax model because of concerns
over how to translate ordinal preferences into the cardinal utility functions necessary for using a Utilitarian
social objective function.2 As Mirrlees (1971) acknowledged, his formulation of the optimal tax problem
makes some strong assumptions, the second of which is:
"Diﬀerences in tastes, in family size and composition, and in voluntary transfers, are ignored.
These raise rather diﬀerent kinds of problems, and it is natural to assume them away."
This simpliﬁcation freed Mirrlees3 to assume that the only way in which people diﬀer is in their ability to
earn income. His approach has been dominant ever since.
The assumption that all heterogeneity takes the form of ability is a bold one, because allowing hetero-
geneity to enter in a more general manner can render the Mirrleesian optimal tax model powerless. As
Sandmo (1993) showed in an insightful paper, the problem is that observationally equivalent representations
of heterogeneity can yield dramatically diﬀerent optimal tax policies. An individual with low income may
have low ability, following Mirrlees’ model, or he may place a low value on consumption. In the former case,
optimal policy redistributes to him; in the latter, it does not and, under some cardinalizations of preferences,
it may even redistribute from him. As long as both ability and preferences are unobservable, it is not possible
to distinguish these interpretations with data on economic behavior.
To pin down an optimal policy, we must assume that one of the interpretations, and thus cardinalizations,
of heterogeneity is the appropriate one. Building on the work of Sandmo, recent contributions by Boadway
et al. (2002) and Kaplow (2008) incorporate heterogeneous preferences while remaining agnostic about the
appropriate cardinalization and show that the implications for optimal redistribution are ambiguous. Choné
and Laroque (2010) provide an elegant discussion of the same lesson for the sign of marginal income tax
rates, which are always nonnegative in the conventional model but may be negative once heterogeneous
preferences (or opportunity costs of work, in their words) are incorporated.
2The use of a Utilitarian social welfare function in this context has its formal roots in Harsanyi (1953, 1955).
3Mirrlees was not the ﬁrst to adopt this simpliﬁcation. Pigou (1928) wrote, in a classic text: "Of course, in so far as tastes
and temperaments diﬀer, allowance ought, in strictness, to be made for this fact...But, since it is impossible in practice to take
account of variations between diﬀerent people’s capacity for enjoyment, this consideration must be ignored, and the assumption
made, for want of a better, that temperamentally all taxpayers are alike."
3In this paper, we focus our attention on the cardinalization of utility under which preference heterogeneity
justiﬁes no redistribution. We show that incorporating such preference heterogeneity does not necessarily
imply less optimal redistribution, and we clarify the (plausible) conditions under which it does.
The potential impact of this interpretation of preferences on optimal taxation has long been emphasized
by those skeptical of redistribution, consistent with our results. Robert Nozick, an inﬂuential modern
philosopher and leading expositor of the Libertarian normative framework, wrote in his book Anarchy,
State, and Utopia (1974): "Why should we treat the man whose happiness requires certain material goods
or services diﬀerently from the man whose preferences and desires make such goods unnecessary for his
happiness?" Along similar lines, Milton Friedman (1962) wrote: "Given individuals whom we are prepared
to regard as alike in ability and initial resources, if some have a greater taste for leisure and others for
marketable goods, inequality of return through the market is necessary to achieve equality of total return
or equality of treatment." The broad inﬂuence4 of arguments such as Nozick’s and Friedman’s suggests, at
least to us, that a convincing theory of optimal taxation ought to carefully address the substance of their
critique.
Our approach is thus close in spirit to the important recent work of Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006),
who explore the eﬀects of preference heterogeneity on optimal taxation from the perspective of the social
choice literature. As do we, they assume (in the form of so-called fairness assumptions) that the appropriate
cardinalization of preferences over consumption and leisure is such that optimal policy redistributes across
ability but not across preferences. Unlike us, however, they impose informational constraints on the social
planner which rule out conventional Utilitarian social welfare functions and which, in combination with
particular fairness requirements on allocations, imply the use of a maximin social welfare function.5 Our
analysis can be seen as a complement to theirs. While their paper argues for and adopts a speciﬁcn o r m a t i v e
approach that sets it apart from the conventional Mirrleesian literature, we build directly on that dominant
theory to show the eﬀects of preference heterogeneity on conventional results, and we provide evidence that
these eﬀects are consistent with existing policy variation.
A second valuable and recent analysis close to ours is by Judd and Su (2006), who add multiple dimensions
of heterogeneity to a standard Mirrleesian model and simulate optimal policy.6 Though they do not simulate7
policy with the heterogeneity in preferences for consumption relative to leisure that are the focus of our paper,
they consider several other types of heterogeneity, including in labor supply elasticities and basic needs. Their
results are broadly consistent with ours, in that they show through illustrative numerical simulations that
adding other sources of heterogeneity to a given distribution of income-earning abilities typically reduces
redistribution.8 Several features diﬀerentiate our paper from theirs, including our calibration of the model
to data, our use of continuous type distributions in the numerical simulations, and our analysis of existing
policies as a test of the model’s predictions. But there is also a more subtle technical diﬀerence. Rather than
layering on sources of heterogeneity, our paper starts with observed variation in earnings and analyzes the
eﬀects of attributing more or less of that variation to preferences. This approach yields two advantages. First,
it clariﬁes the conditions under which adding preference heterogeneity could increase optimal redistribution
4For one recent example of this inﬂuence, see Bryan Caplan (2011), who argues for less redistributive taxes based on evidence
in Kahneman (2011) that such preference diﬀerences are widespread at early ages and correlate with outcomes later in life.
5Given that setting, they conclude that the optimal income tax should maximize the subsidies to the working poor: that is,
it should be quite redistributive to those with low ability but who exert labor eﬀort.
6Judd and Su (2006) also address the computational complications that arise from multiple dimensions of heterogeneity. See
also Tarkiainen and Tuomala (2004). We avoid these concerns by restricting tax instruments to the grant and linear tax rate.
7The possibility of such variation is included in their theoretical setup, however.
8Judd and Su (2006) also ﬁnd that optimal marginal tax rates need not be bounded below by zero. See also Chone and
Laroque (2010).
4(i.e., if income and preferences are negatively correlated). Second, it makes the model with preference
heterogeneity more directly comparable to the conventional model because both must explain an empirical
distribution of earnings, whereas adding preference heterogeneity on top of ability heterogeneity changes the
distribution of income and, therefore, complicates the comparison of policies.
Two other recent papers have produced results consistent with those of this paper, though they rely
on somewhat diﬀerent channels. Kocherlakota and Phelan (2009) focus on the implications of policymaker
uncertainty about the relationship between individuals’ preferences and another, welfare-relevant, dimension
of heterogeneity such as wealth. They argue that such uncertainty causes a planner using a maximin objective
to avoid redistributive policy that is optimal when no such uncertainty is present. Beaudry, Blackorby, and
Szalay (2009) indirectly address preference diﬀerences by including in their optimal tax analysis diﬀerences
in productivity of market and non-market labor eﬀort. They show that the optimal redistributive policy
makes transfers to the poor conditional on work.
2 A model of optimal tax with heterogeneous preferences
In this section, we generalize Mirrlees’ approach by allowing the tax authority to assign shares of the variation
in earnings to both unobserved ability and unobserved preferences over consumption and leisure. Mirrlees’
assumption is a particular case of this general model. A key technical advantage of our approach is that
we include preferences as a component of observable earnings heterogeneity rather than as an addition to
unobservable ability. The latter approach imposes too few restrictions on the relationship between ability
and preferences for clear comparisons to conventional results to be derived.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals exert labor eﬀort to earn income. They use that income plus any transfers from the government
to pay taxes and purchase consumption. Individuals are heterogeneous, such that for any given tax system,
there will be a distribution of pre-tax incomes. The sources of heterogeneity are unobservable.
In the conventional setup, individuals diﬀer in their abilities to earn income by exerting labor eﬀort.
Individuals are indexed with  ∈ {12}, where the income-earning ability of individual  is denoted .
Individual preferences over consumption  and labor eﬀort  = ,w h e r e is observable labor income, are













where 0 determines the concavity of utility from consumption and 1 aﬀects the elasticity of labor
supply.
A convenient feature of this conventional formalization is that data on the distribution of earnings 
is suﬃcient to extract the distribution of types , given the tax function that translates earnings into





Once a distribution of  is known, optimal policy can be determined. Note that heterogeneity in  does
not aﬀect the utility functions of individuals, but rather their budget constraints.
5We introduce to this conventional model preferences over consumption and labor eﬀort (equivalently,
leisure). Type is now deﬁned by a duple { }, where the taste parameter  multiplies the marginal rate













Note that, unlike the conventional utility function in (1), the utility function in (3) is type-speciﬁc, because
utility as a function of consumption and labor eﬀort now depends on the individual’s taste parameter 
Having these two unobservable dimensions of heterogeneity,  and , presents a problem of observational
equivalence. The level of earnings chosen by individual  will be a function of both  and ,a n dn oo b s e r v e r
can determine the relative importance of each factor from data on economic behavior.9 For example, if there





In contrast to expression (2), expression (4) indicates that agents may earn the same income and therefore be
observationally equivalent despite having diﬀerent skills and tastes. As we show below, these two dimensions
of heterogeneity have dramatically diﬀerent implications for redistribution, so determining their roles is
essential for optimal policy.
This problem of observational equivalence motivates a technical contribution of our paper: transforming
the unobservable variables  and  into two new variables, one of which is observed, the other of which
is not. We use income (which is observable) as one dimension of heterogeneity, and allow for a second,
unobserved dimension that adjusts the relative importance of ability and preferences. This transformation
allows us to derive novel results that can be compared directly with conventional results.
Formally, in our generalized model, individuals can be fully described by a duple type denoted { }.





Taking logs of expression (5), we obtain:
ln =
1









 ln (1 − )ln
As indicated in (6),w eu s et h ev a r i a b l e to divide variation in earnings into two components equal to the
two terms on the right-hand side of (6).
We will refer to , somewhat loosely, as the share of income variation attributed to preferences rather







9A corollary to this issue, not pursued in this paper, is that simulations of optimal policy that extract an ability distribution
from the income distribution under the assumption that preferences are homogeneous are potentially misleading. See Figure 4
below for a related point.

















This is the utility representation we will use throughout the paper. Note that the only unobservable variable
in (9) is , the share of income variation attributed to preferences rather than ability.
The scalars  in expression (9) are the key parameters of this model, because we can vary them to consider
a wide range of assumptions on the sources of individual heterogeneity. For instance, the conventional
Mirrleesian approach boils down to the following assumption:
 =  =0for all  ∈ {12} (10)
that is, that the share of income variation attributed to preferences is zero. By assuming (10), Mirrlees’
approach sets  =1for all  ∈ {12}, so that preferences over consumption relative to labor eﬀort are
the same for all individuals. This paper is about the possibility that  6=0for all or some  ∈ {12}.
2.2 The tax design problem
A tax designer takes individual behavior as given and sets policy to maximize a social welfare function
subject to economic feasibility. We restrict policy to a linear income tax rate  and a uniform grant ,a
rough but commonly-used approximation of optimal tax results in general (see Mirrlees 1971 and Mankiw,
Weinzierl, and Yagan 2010). There is a long tradition of considering optimal linear tax functions for the sake
of tractability and clarity (e.g., Sheshinksi 1972 and Hellwig 1986), a tradition that has carried through to
modern analyses as well (e.g., Farhi and Werning 2011). The most important advantage of doing so for our
purposes is that the optimal linear tax rate in this policy can be used as a succinct measure of redistribution,
the focus of our analysis.10
The social welfare function is weighted Utilitarian. The tax designer applies type-speciﬁc multiplicative
weights, denoted , to utilities, where  ≥ 0 for all  ∈ {12}. These weights are used to normalize
preferences to be neutral with respect to redistribution.11 We deﬁne this normalization formally as part of
the policy problem.





























( − ) ≥ 0 (13)
10A natural extension of this paper is to consider the eﬀect of preferences on optimal nonlinear taxes.
11See Section 1’s discussion of the related fairness requirements of Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and the claims by Nozick
and Friedman.






holds for all  ∈ {12}, and where the welfare weights {}

=1 are chosen so that the Tax Design
Problem satisﬁes Preference Neutrality, deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition: Preference Neutrality
Preference Neutrality is satisﬁed by the Tax Design Problem if and only if the following condition holds:
 =1for all  ∈ {12} ⇒  =0and  =0  (15)
That is, if all individuals have the same ability (i.e.,  =¯  for some constant ¯ ), then the solution to the
Tax Design Problem entails no redistribution of income.
The assumption of Preference Neutrality requires that in a world with diﬀerences only in preferences, no
interpersonal transfers are justiﬁed. By assuming Preference Neutrality, we pin down values for the welfare
weights that can then be applied to the more general situation with heterogeneity in both preferences and
ability.12
Note that Preference Neutrality formalizes an important conceptual distinction between the two unob-
servable dimensions of heterogeneity in this paper,  and .W h i l e is entirely deserving of redistribution,
 is entirely undeserving of redistribution. This binary distinction could be generalized to include interme-
diate cases. That is, we might array the potentially large number of ways in which individuals diﬀer along a
spectrum, the poles of which are  and . For instance, the presence of dependent children can be thought
of in part as generating greater consumption needs (which may justify redistribution) and in part as being a
choice variable of the parents (which would not justify redistribution). Importantly, even such intermediate
cases would have the same qualititative implications for redistribution as does , as long as they cannot be
taxed directly, because the conventional model assumes all heterogeneity is best modeled as of the  form.
In the next two sections we study the tax design problem under two assumptions about the nature
of preference variation: i.e., whether preferences are uniform conditional on income or whether they vary
conditional on income.
3O p t i m a l p o l i c y w i t h  =  for all types
We start our analysis with a speciﬁc case of the Tax Design Problem that keeps us close to the conventional
Mirrleesian approach but that nevertheless generates dramatically diﬀerent results. In particular, in this
section we assume  =  for all  ∈ {12}, meaning that all individuals with a given income have
the same preferences and the same ability. However, we allow for  6=0 , contrary to Mirrlees’ assumption
(expression 10) We start with analytical results for a simpliﬁed version of the tax designer’s problem to clarify
the main mechanism at work. Then, we derive numerical results for a wide range of model parameterizations.
12We do not claim that ours is the only plausible approach to normalizing preferences. This is a relatively simple and
transparent option, and our results do not depend on the speciﬁcs of normalization so long as preferences are treated as less
deserving of redistribution than ability. Indeed, the more general normative treatment of preferences made possible by using
 weights is why we do not incorporate the normalization implied by Preference Neutrality directly into the individual utility
function.
83.1 Analytical results in a simpliﬁed tax design problem
In this example we impose several simplifying assumptions on the Tax Design Problem of expressions (11)
through (14) to provide the clearest picture of the eﬀect of preferences on optimal policy. In particular, we
show that a role for preferences changes optimal policy even in the ﬁrst-best scenario (i.e., with no incentive
eﬀects of taxation).
First, we assume that there are only two types of individuals, a low type and a high type:  =2and
  .W i t ho n l yt w ot y p e s ,t h et a xs y s t e mi sr e d u c i b l et oat r a n s f e rf r o mo n et y p et ot h eo t h e r .W el a b e l
that transfer , and without loss of generality assume that  =  +  while  =  −  so that 0 is a
transfer from the high type to the low type.
Second, individuals do not respond to the tax system, instead choosing how much income to earn as if
 =0 . For our present purposes, this assumption is not as restrictive as it may ﬁrst appear. With  =2 ,
we are studying whether the high type is taxed to support the low type and how this varies with .T h e
answers to those questions are determined by the tax designer’s objective function, not the constraints it
faces.
Third, we choose parameter values that make our analytical results cleaner. We set  =1and  =2 ,
implying logarithmic utility of consumption and quadratic disutility of labor eﬀort.
Using expression (9) and the assumptions just stated, the tax design problem in this setting is:





































where each individual chooses income as if  =0 , implying that for  ∈ {}:
 =  (17)
and Preference Neutrality implies that for  ∈ {}:
 =( )
−1  (18)
Note that condition (17) implies that the high type chooses to earn more income than the low type in
this setup. The derivation of expression (18) is in the Appendix.













We are interested in the eﬀect of the assumed value for  on .W h e n =0 , as in the conventional model,
expression (19) implies 0.W h e na l lv a r i a t i o ni ne a r n i n g si sa t t r i b u t e dt op r e f e r e n c e s ,s ot h a t =1 ,t h e
optimal policy sets  =0 .U s i n g(19), we can directly show the following result.














´2  0 (20)
This proposition shows that optimal redistribution, as measured by the transfer from the high-income
individual to the low-income individual, decreases whenever a greater portion of income variation is attributed
to preferences. By implication, any value of 0 will generate a lower optimal tax rate than the conventional
Mirrleesian approach recommends.13
Why is the optimal extent of redistribution inversely related to ?I f =0 , the social welfare function
in (16) implies that the high type generates less disutility from earning a given income than does the low
type, but both generate the same utility from a given amount of consumption. Policy will maximize social
welfare if it requires the high type to earn more of society’s income but leaves both types with the same level
of consumption. For any 0 the social welfare function implies that the high type generates more utility
from a given amount of consumption than the low type (the high type continues to generate less disutility
from earning a given income as long as 1,b u tt h ed i ﬀerence is less). Thus, policy will maximize social
welfare if it allows the high type to consume more of its income.
While this simple example has allowed us to generate a clear result on the eﬀects of preferences on
redistribution, a more comprehensive and quantitative analysis requires numerical simulations of the general
tax design problem. We turn to those next.
3.2 Numerical results in a calibrated tax design problem
In this section we present numerical results for optimal policy under conventional and alternative assumptions
on the role of preferences in explaining income variation, as measured by the common value of .F o rv a l u e s
in the range  ∈ [−12], we generate optimal values for , the linear income tax rate chosen by the tax
designer solving the Tax Design Problem of expressions (11) through (14). The budget constraint guarantees
that a higher value for  implies a larger uniform grant , so that redistribution unambiguously increases
with .
Our analyses yield a clear result consistent with Proposition 1 above: when more of the variation in
incomes across individuals is attributed to preferences rather than ability, optimal redistribution declines.
To perform the simulations, we specify the distribution of individual types and choose values for the
model’s parameters. One advantage of this paper’s approach to modeling heterogeneity is that we can
calibrate the distribution of individual types {}

=1 from microdata on earnings for the United States. We
assume  is drawn from a lognormal distribution with parameters  and . For a simulated vector {}
=1,
we can calculate the resulting income distribution {}
=1 for given tax parameters  and . Kotlikoﬀ and
Rapson (2006) estimate that U.S. average net marginal tax rates are in the neighborhood of 40%, and that
the implied demogrant is approximately $20,000. Therefore, using  =0 4 and an appropriate value for
,w eﬁnd the parameters of the  distribution that minimize the sum of squared diﬀerences between our
simulated income quintile thresholds and those reported by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2004. The resulting
parameter estimates, using 5,000 agents (and rounded to the nearest 0.01) are  =1 65 and  =0 75.
13The inequality in expression (20) holds for all assumptions on the welfare weights {}= so long as the weights are
independent of  While Preference Neutrality seems the natural assumption to us, it is not required for the result.
10Our conceptual results are not sensitive to these parameter values, but having a realistic calibration makes
the magnitudes of our results easier to interpret. We consider a range of parameter values that spans most
mainstream estimates:  ∈ {05 1 2} and  ∈ {15 3 6}. For brevity, at times we will use a speciﬁc
baseline speciﬁcation, for which we assume  =1and  =3  We choose values for the welfare weights  to
satisfy Preference Neutrality, as described in the Appendix.
Figure 1 plots  against , showing how optimal redistribution varies with the role attributed to pref-
erences. The Mirrleesian benchmark is at  =0 , while the case in which all variation is attributed to
preferences is at  =1 . Each subplot is a () pair.












































































































Figure 1: Optimal linear tax rate as a function of  for a range of parameter values
Figure 1 shows that the optimal linear tax rate is monotonically decreasing with the importance attributed
to preferences rather than ability in explaining income variation for all sets of parameter values. Note that
the values of {}

=1 cause the optimal  for  =1to be zero in all cases.
Figure 1 also shows that our model clariﬁes the conditions under which incorporating preferences would
increase the optimal extent of redistribution relative to the conventional approach. Optimal redistribution
exceeds the conventional model’s benchmark when  falls below the Mirrleesian assumption of  =0 .
The key question raised by this ﬁnding is whether values of 0 are reasonable. It turns out that 0
implies a counterintuitive feature of the individual utility function, suggesting that the conventional value
of  =0is a special and, in an important sense, extreme assumption. We formalize this in the following
proposition, the proof of which can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2:
If 0, the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure (i.e., the relative preference for






11In words, 0 implies that high income earners have lower preferences for additional consumption than
those who earn less if given the same starting levels of consumption and leisure. To the extent that scenario
is implausible, a value of zero is a natural lower bound on .14
This section has shown that optimal redistributiond e c l i n e sw h e nm o r eo ft h ev a r i a t i o ni ni n c o m ei s
attributed to greater tastes for consumption among high earners rather than greater income-earning abilities.
This section’s model captures only one way in which preferences may be thought to interact with ability,
however. Thus far we have assumed all individuals with a given income have the same preferences and
ability. Next, we analyze the more realistic case in which preferences may vary conditional on income.
4 Optimal policy with variation in 
In this section, we consider variation in , which implies variation in preferences conditional on income.
We work with the same Tax Design Problem (expressions 11 through 14) and rely on numerical simulations,
given the analytical complexity of this case. We ﬁnd a striking result: conditional preference heterogeneity
is even more likely to imply lower optimal redistribution. Speciﬁcally, optimal redistribution is lower than
in the conventional model for every one of the wide variety of distributions of {}

=1 that we consider in
which we retain the conventional assumption that  []=0 .15
We show results for simulations in which  ∼  (0); that is,  follows a Normal distribution
centered at  []=0with variance . Using alternative, asymmetric distributions for  does not change
our ﬁndings.16 Figure 2 plots the optimal  against  in this case (other parameters are at baseline levels).






























Figure 2: Optimal tax rate as a function of the variance of 
14Related, 1 implies that income-earning ability and income are negatively related.
15Throughout, we assume that the distributions of {}
=1 and {}
=1 are independent. Independence means that the
variation in the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure is similar at each level of earnings. That is, high earners
are no more or less variable in their preference for consumption relative to leisure than are low earners. Though an analysis
with interdependent distributions may be of interest, we leave that to future work.
16For example, deﬁne the lognormally-distributed variable  ∼ ln (005). Consider two distributions with  []=0ﬁrst,
 =  −  [], which yields a right-skewed distribution; second,  =  [] − , which yields a left-skewed distribution. The
optimal  for these cases are negative and 0.39, respectively, whereas  in the conventional case is 0.50.
12Figure 2 shows that the more heterogeneity of this type that one adds to the model, conditional on a given
amount of income variation, the lower the optimal level of redistribution.
A related implication is shown in Figure 3, where we allow  [] to diﬀer from zero. Figure 3 plots the































Figure 3: Pairs of { ()[]} yielding conventional optimal tax rate
Figure 3 shows that conditional preference heterogeneity lowers the value of  [] for which optimal redis-
tribution equals the conventional model’s recommendation. In other words, increased conditional preference
heterogeneity is consistent with redistribution at or above the level of the conventional model only if it is
oﬀset with a lower value for  [], that is, only if preferences for consumption are, on average, negatively
related to income earned.
These results suggest that allowing preference heterogeneity into the conventional approach reduces
redistribution even if the Mirrleesian assumption is correct on average (i.e., for the average individual).
Intuitively, variation in  means that income will be a noisier signal of ability. Redistribution will be less
accurate: some high earners will have low ability and some low earners will have high ability, so a tax designer
weighing the distortionary costs of redistribution against smaller beneﬁts will choose a lower optimal level.
Related to this intuition is how diﬀerent assumptions on the extent of preference heterogeneity aﬀect the
implied distributions of ability for a given distribution of earnings. Expression (8) deﬁned the measure of
income-earning ability for individual  in our model. Figure 4 shows, for the same calibrated distribution of
, the distributions of ability that are implied when we vary the assumed distribution of .W ec o n s i d e r
the standard Mirrleesian case, in which ( [][]) = (00), and three additional cases: (0200),
(0001),a n d(0201). The latter three cases correspond to the structure of the paper, where we ﬁrst
allowed for no conditional variation in preferences but increased the role for preferences on average, then
allowed for conditional variation but with the conventional role for preferences on average, and ﬁnally allowed
for both conditional variation and a greater role for preferences on average. The optimal  for these cases
are: 050 043 045 and 037.
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Figure 4: Ability distributions implied by diﬀerent assumptions on  [][]
As the ﬁgure shows, the implied distributions of ability are more compressed when the role for preferences in
explaining variation in earnings is greater on average (i.e., when moving from the ﬁrst to the second column
of Figure 4). With less variation in ability, the tax designer gains less social welfare from redistributing, so
the optimal extent of redistribution is lower. Increasing the conditional variation in preferences (i.e., moving
from the ﬁrst to the second row of Figure 4) may generate more or less compressed ability distributions,
but it weakens the relationship between observed income and ability, making income a noisier indicator of
ability and lowering optimal redistribution, as well.
In this and the preceding section we have established that the standard model occupies a special, and
arguably extreme position in favor of redistribution if preferences for consumption relative to leisure vary
across individuals. This conclusion may help explain the puzzle noted by Diamond and Saez (2011) that
top marginal tax rates in the United States are substantially lower than conventional theory recommends.
It also suggests that we might look for evidence of preference heterogeneity’s eﬀects in real-world policy.
5 Empirical evidence on preferences and policy
In this section, we translate the results of the previous sections into an empirically-testable prediction for
policy: more variation in reported preferences for consumption relative to leisure ought to be associated with
less redistribution, once we control for the distribution of earnings and the extent of correlation between
reported preferences and earnings. Then, we use survey data on preferences and standard measures of
redistribution to conﬁrm that this prediction holds across both countries and U.S. states.
145.1 Deriving a testable prediction
In previous sections, we showed that optimal redistribution is inversely related to both  [] and  [].
The distribution of  is unobservable, however, so these results are not directly testable using data on
economic behavior.
It turns out that survey data on preference heterogeneity may help us to learn about the distribution of
 and, therefore, test the predictions of the theory. To see how, start with the assumption that individuals
responding to survey questions on preferences over leisure and material goods are reporting information
about their marginal rates of substitution (MRS) of consumption for leisure. For individual  given the
















Without loss of generality, normalize 1 =1 . Then, the ratio 1 is simply the normalized




In words,  measures the (normalized) strength of each individual ’s willingness to work to obtain con-
sumption. Next, manipulate expression (23) to obtain  [ln()] =  [( +  − 1) ln].U s i n g t h e
standard expression for the variance of a product of independent17 variables, we can write:
 [ln()]( +  − 1)




2 +  (ln)
i
 () (24)
Condition (24) links variation in reported preferences () to the properties of the distribution of .
Suppose that a tax designer observes an increase in the variance of reported preferences: i.e., an increase
in the left-hand side of expression (24). This implies some changes to  [] or  () given ﬁxed values
for   and {}

=1. What do these changes imply for optimal redistribution?
In some cases, this increased variation in reported preferences would directly imply that redistribution
ought to fall. In particular, it could be that preferences play a greater role in explaining income variation
on average: that is, ( [])
2 rises. Or, it could be that there is an increase in the variation of preferences
conditional on income: that is, greater  (). In either case, controlling for  and the distribution of ,
the tax designer knows that the optimal tax rate and extent of redistribution are lower.
A third possibility, however, complicates the relationship between reported preferences and optimal re-
distribution. If  () increases but ( [])
2 decreases, the right-hand side of expression (24) may still
increase (note that the two terms are multiplied by diﬀe r e n tf a c t o r s )w h i l et h eo p t imal extent of redistri-
bution increases (due to the decrease in  []). This possibility suggests that the tax designer requires
additional information to accurately interpret changes in reported preferences.
It turns out that a single additional observable statistic—the correlation of reported preferences and
income—is suﬃcient to clarify the implications for optimal redistribution. To see why, note that for more
v a r i a t i o ni nr e p o r t e dp r e f e r e n c e st ob ec o n s i s tent with greater optimal redistribution,  [] must decrease
and  () must increase. In that case, preferences would be less important on average in explaining
variation of incomes, and individuals with a given income would vary more in their preferences. In other
17See the ﬁrst footnote in Section 4.
15words, the correlation of income and preferences would have fallen.
Conveniently,  [] and  () fully determine both the variance of reported preferences (via expression
24) and the correlation of income and preferences in this model, given   and the distribution of .18
Any given pair { []()} also determines the optimal marginal tax rate, as in Figure 3 above. Thus,
the tax designer can generate a ﬁgure such as the following to guide policy:






















Optimal τ < τ*
Optimal τ > τ*
Figure 5: Optimal linear tax rate isoquant in  (ln())( ) space
Figure 5 plots the isoquant for an arbitrarily-chosen linear tax rate ∗ in  [ln()]( ) space,
where ( ) is the correlation between reported preferences and earnings. To the northeast of the
isoquant, the optimal tax rate is less; to the southwest, it is greater.
To understand the ﬁgure, ﬁrst consider a horizontal movement to the right starting at any point on the
isoquant. In that case the tax designer observes an increase in the variation of reported preferences and no
change in the correlation of preferences and income. This automatically implies that optimal redistribution
ought to fall. Similarly, for any given variation in reported preferences, an increase in the correlation of
preferences and income (a vertical movement) implies that income is a worse signal of ability, so redistribution
ought to fall.
At the same time, the isoquant in Figure 5 is not a vertical line. It is possible that the variance in reported
preferences could increase (a movement to the right) while the correlation of preferences and incomes could
fall far enough (a movement down) so that the optimal tax rate would rise. This is the graphical version of
the third possibility discussed above in the context of expression (24).
Altogether, these analyses suggest the testable prediction of the model stated at the start of this section:
reported variation in preferences for consumption relative to leisure should be negatively related to the
extent of redistribution, controlling for the distribution of earnings and the individual-level correlation of
preferences with earnings. We turn to testing that prediction now.
18Income  and the variable  are perfectly correlated, so ( )=( )
165.2 International evidence
First, we consider cross-sectional19 international data. Redistribution is measured by the size of social
expenditures20 as a share of GDP in 1995 as reported by the OECD. Very similar results are obtained if we
use the highest marginal tax rate on personal income in 2000, the economy-wide average tax rate, or the
diﬀerence between gross and net Gini coeﬃcients as alternative measures of redistribution. Preferences are
measured with responses to the World Values Survey’s question C008, asked between 1995 and 2001:
"Which point on this scale [1 through 5] most clearly describes how much weight you place on
work (including housework and schoolwork), as compared with leisure or recreation?"
1 It´s leisure that makes life worth living, not work
...
5 Work is what makes life worth living, not leisure
The variance of answers to the question serves as our measure of preference variation, formally  [ln()]
in expression (24) This question is far from ideal for eliciting the marginal rate of substitution of consumption
for leisure. Nevertheless, the extremes of this scale indicate fundamentally diﬀerent attitudes toward the
value of leisure and the question asks individuals to compare the value of leisure to the value of work, the
return to which is (in this and most economic models) consumption. The distributions of responses for the
countries in our sample are provided in the Appendix.
To get a sense for how the data correspond to the model’s prediction, Figure 6 plots social transfers as
a share of GDP against the variance of responses for ﬁfteen OECD country observations.
Figure 6: Redistribution and preference variation in 15 OECD countries
19Panel analysis would be desirable, but the survey data we use to measure preferences is available over at most a ten-year
horizon. We believe this is too narrow a window over which to expect either meaningful changes in preference variation or a
response to any such changes in policy, so we leave the analysis of panel data for future research.
20Social expenditures include the following programs, according to the OECD deﬁnition: "Old age, Survivors, Incapacity-
related beneﬁts, Health, Family, Active labor market programmes, Unemployment, Housing, and Other social policy areas."
See www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure.
17A negative relationship between these variables is apparent in Figure 6. That is, countries with more
variation in preferences for consumption relative to leisure appear to have less redistributive policies. Of
course, Figure 6 is not convincing evidence of a statistically meaningful relationship. To more carefully
study the relationship between these variables, we want to control for some important additional factors
suggested by the analysis above. The results of a simple OLS regression with several such controls is shown
in Table 1.
Table 1: Social transfers as a share of GDP
(1) (2)
Variance of reported preferences -18.27** -17.92**
(5.35) (7.64)
Log of GDP per capita -3.67
(6.88)
Gross Gini coeﬃcient -0.55*
(0.29)




Mean of reported preferences -11.51
(7.95)
Observations 15 15
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.50
Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is social
transfers as a share of GDP. The sample is OECD countries with suﬃcient data.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. **p0.05; *p0.10
T h eu n i v a r i a t er e g r e s s i o n( 1 )e s t i m a t e st h eb e s t - ﬁt line for Figure 6 to give a baseline for comparison.
Regression (2) more carefully tests the predicted relationship between preference heterogeneity and redistri-
bution derived at the start of this section. That prediction is conditional on two things: the distribution of 
(laissez-faire income21) and the correlation of preferences to earnings. To account for the former, we control
for the level and spread of pretax income with the log of GDP per capita and the (gross) Gini coeﬃcient22
as reported in Solt (2008-9). To account for the latter, we calculate correlations between individuals’ re-
ported preferences and income, where income is given by individuals’ reports to the World Values Survey of
21We do not observe laissez-faire income, and instead use the distribution of pre-tax income. Given progressive taxation, the
distribution of gross pre-tax income is likely to be compressed relative to the distribution of . The extent of the omitted
gap between laissez-faire and pre-tax inequality will be positively correlated to redistribution. This omitted gap may bias our
estimated coeﬃcient of interest toward zero. To see why, suppose that we accurately measure the level of preference variation.
But, we underestimate of the level of income variation, and the gap is greater in more redistributive countries. Then, we attribute
too great a share of income variation in redistributive countries to preferences. In other words, we are biased toward ﬁnding
more preference variation as a share of total variation in redistributive countries than is true in reality, pushing the coeﬃcient
on the variance of reported preferences toward zero. Another way to see this is to note that, given a distribution of ability, the
extent of variation in preferences is positively related to the spread of laissez-faire income. Thus, the coeﬃcient on the variance
of preferences may absorb some of the positive correlation between the omitted income inequality and redistribution.
22We use the 1990 level of the Gini coeﬃcient to avoid a concern that contemporaneous policy could aﬀect the extent of
pre-tax inequality. Similar results are obtained using 1995 or 2000 Gini coeﬃcients, instead, though the signiﬁcance level of the
coeﬃcient on the variance of reported preferences drops to the ten percent level.
18their income tercile. In addition to these controls, we control for two other variables.23 First, an alternative
potential explanation for our results is that the extent of ethnic heterogeneity is driving both variance in
preferences and the level of redistribution, so we control for a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization
taken from Alesina et al. (2003). Second, we include the mean reported preference in each country to help
rule out concerns with scaling.
The results conﬁrm the model’s central prediction, with heterogenous preferences statistically signiﬁcantly
predicting less redistribution. The coeﬃcient on the variance of preferences changes little when we add control
variables, further supporting the robustness of the relationship. Similar results hold if we use any of the
alternative measures of redistribution as the explanatory variable.
Furthermore, the importance of preference heterogeneity appears to be sizeable. If we estimate regression
(2) excluding it, the adjusted R-squared falls from the 0.50 reported in Table 1 to 0.25. In other words,
preference heterogeneity explains one-third of the residual variance from a regression predicting the extent
of redistribution across OECD countries with the other independent variables shown in Table 1.
A natural concern with this analysis is reverse causality. That is, more redistributive policy may generate
more uniform labor eﬀort across individuals and, if the survey question is eliciting marginal values of leisure
(rather than the marginal rates of substitution from a common starting point that we assume in the theory),
one may worry whether this would generate more uniform preferences. In fact, the bias is likely to go in
the other direction. To see why, consider two individuals with the same income-earning ability but diﬀerent
preferences for consumption relative to leisure. If they answer the survey assuming a common allocation of
consumption and leisure, we will observe the true preference diﬀerence in their responses. On the other hand,
if they answer assuming a realized allocation of consumption and leisure rather than the abstract common
allocation, the high-preference individual will have chosen to earn more consumption and take less leisure.
For that individual, the marginal value of consumption will fall relative to leisure, so his reported preference
for consumption will fall and we will observe a smaller diﬀerence in preferences between the two individuals.
In other words, the distribution of reported preferences will be compressed relative to the distribution of
true preferences if surveys are answered “on the margin”. Importantly, the extent of this compression will
be greatest in countries with the least redistributive systems, as individuals are then encouraged to earn
nearer their preferred positions. Thus, reported preference variation is likely to be (misleadingly) smaller
where redistribution is also smaller, inducing a positive bias to the estimated coeﬃcient on the variance of
preferences in our results above.
Our ﬁndings can be interpreted as consistent with two prominent explanations for diﬀerences in redistri-
bution across countries. First, a large literature has argued that an individual taxpayer may be more willing
to support redistribution if his country’s population is more homogenous (see Desmet et al, 2009, for exam-
ple). The explanation for such ﬁndings is usually that individuals have greater aﬃnity for those like them.
The results of this paper provide evidence of a speciﬁc channel, preferences over consumption relative to
leisure, through which homogeneity may generate these greater feelings of camaraderie and kinship. Second,
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show that countries with less redistributive policies are those in which most
individuals believe eﬀort, rather than luck, is the main determinant of personal income. That important
ﬁnding leaves open the question of where such beliefs come from. Our results can help, as they imply that
in countries where more of the variation in incomes is due to heterogeneous preferences, optimal taxes are
less redistributive and a larger share of high earners are willing to exert substantial eﬀort.
23We have also added the variance in answers to a "placebo" question from the same survey to check for whether some
countries simply give more variable answers than others. The results are essentially unchanged from those in the Table.
195.3 Evidence from U.S. states
Next, we test for whether the results across OECD countries hold at a subnational level inside the United
States. Our preferred measure of redistribution is that of Feldstein and Wrobel (1998), who calculate the
diﬀerence between the (statutory) average state income tax rates at the $100,000 and $10,000 income levels
in 1989.24 For preferences, we use responses to a question on the importance of material possessions from
the General Social Survey administered in the United States in 1993.25 Question 477E is:
"I’m going to read you a list of some things that diﬀerent people value. Some people say these
things are very important to them. Other people say they are not so important. Please tell me
how important each things is to you personally, using the responses on this card (HAND CARD
TO RESPONDENT). How about having nice things? Is it one of the most important values you
hold, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?
1 One of the most important
...
5 Not at all important
Figure 7 plots redistribution against the variance of responses to this question.
Figure 7: Redistribution and preference variation in 36 U.S. states
As did Figure 6 for the international evidence, Figure 7 displays a negative relationship between the
variation in reported preferences and redistribution across U.S. states. We explore this relationship further
in Table 2, which shows the results in a similar format as Table 1.
24The results are similar if we use the highest state marginal tax rate on personal income in 1993 as catalogued by the Tax
Foundation (1994), instead.
25T h eg e o g r a p h i ci d e n t i ﬁcation codes of the GSS are closely protected to ensure conﬁdentiality. They are used in these analy-
ses but cannot be shared by the author. To obtain the data, contact the National Opinion Research Center at www.norc.org.
20Table 2: Feldstein-Wrobel (1998) measure of redistribution
(1) (2)
Variance of reported preferences -0.011** -0.014**
(0.005) (0.006)
Log of per capita income -0.030
(0.020)
Top decile share of gross income -0.065
(0.171)
Correlation of preferences and earnings n/a
Fraction of state population "white" -0.0005*
0.0003
Mean of reported preferences 0.014
(0.014)
Observations 36 36
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.18
Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression in which the dependent variable
is state-level redistribution as measured in Feldstein and Wrobel (1998)..
T h es a m p l ei sU . S .s t a t e sw i t hs u ﬃcient data.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. **p0.05; *p0.10
The univariate regression (1) again shows the best-ﬁt line for the scatterplot as a basis for comparison.
Regression (2) tests the prediction of the model. As with the same regression in Table 1, it controls for the
pre-tax income distribution with measures of per capita income and income inequality, the latter measured
with the share of the state’s gross income reported to the IRS by the top decile of the population (see Frank,
2009; Gini coeﬃcients at the state level were not available).26 We do not have the individual data required
to compute the correlation between preferences and earnings, so Regression (2) cannot control for that in
this case (it was insigniﬁcant in the results shown in Table 1). We do control for a measure of the racial
diversity within each state and the mean answer to the preferences question, as we did with the international
data.
The results from regression (2) show that the impression in Figure 7 is robust: the negative coeﬃcient on
the variance of preferences changes little when we add these controls, and its signiﬁcance actually increases.
Moreover, we can show that preference heterogeneity explains more than ten percent of the (large) residual
variation from a regression that omits the variance of reported preferences from regression (2). The U.S.
state data thereby provide a second empirical example of redistributive policy consistent with the predictions
of the generalized model developed in this paper.
26As a further test, we cluster states into either four or nine groups based on their levels of per capita income and top decile
income shares. We then re-run the regressions with dummy variables for each "matched" group, relying for identiﬁcation on
variation in the heterogeneity of preferences within clusters. The coeﬃcient on the variance of reported preferences in the case
of four clusters is -0.016 with a (clustered) standard error of 0.008, giving a p-value of 0.13. A similar analysis across countries
is infeasible because of the limited sample size.
216C o n c l u s i o n
T h ea r g u m e n tt h a td i ﬀerences in preferences, not merely ability, play a role in driving the variation in income
across individuals has a long history in critiques of redistributive taxation. Nevertheless, preferences are
assumed to play no such role in the leading modern model of optimal taxation.
This paper generalizes the conventional optimal tax model to include these preferences in a tractable
and normatively natural way, nevertheless staying close to the conventional setup. We then derive, through
both analysis and numerical simulations, novel and clear implications for how optimal redistribution in this
more general model relates to conventional results. Finally, we show a new empirical ﬁnding that suggests
these implications are consistent with evidence on real-world policy and reported preferences.
We ﬁnd that attributing a portion of the observed variation in incomes to preferences rather than ability
reduces the optimal extent of redistribution for the most plausible speciﬁcations of the model. The conven-
tional Mirrleesian approach is a special and, arguably, extreme case. If preference heterogeneity is part of
what drives diﬀerences in individuals’ eﬀort and earnings, this analysis suggests that the standard approach
overstates the optimal extent of redistribution. This may help to explain (in part) a prominent puzzle in
optimal tax research, noted by Diamond and Saez (2011), that existing marginal tax rates in the United
States peak at a level substantially below what the conventional model recommends.
We analyze cross-country and cross-U.S.-state data on preferences and policy and show that, controlling
for a variety of factors, regions with higher variance in preferences have less redistributive policies. This
evidence is consistent with a direct prediction of our model.
Our ﬁndings suggest that this paper’s generalized normative optimal tax model may be a better guide to
policy advice than the conventional one. It also provides a novel explanation for diﬀerences in redistribution
across countries and limits to redistribution within countries. A proper understanding of the role of preference
heterogeneity improves our ability not only to design taxation but to understand existing tax policies.
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24Appendix
Deriving welfare weights that yield Preference Neutrality
Welfare weights can be chosen so that diﬀerences in preferences justify no redistribution in the Simpliﬁed
Tax Design Problem, i.e., to satisfy Preference Neutrality. With unrestricted  the expression for optimal













To obtain optimal  =0 , the tax designer sets
 =1  (26)
for  = {}.
A generalized version of this adjustment to the the Simpliﬁed Tax Design Problem applies to the general




allows the tax designer to adjust the normative treatment of preferences by setting the new parameter
 ∈ [01]. In the Simpliﬁed Tax Design Problem,  =1 2 yielded an optimal policy of no redistribution
when all heterogeneity was assigned to preferences ( =1 ).
For the general Tax Design Problem and the numerical simulations in the paper, we are looking for
values of  so that no redistribution is justiﬁed when  =1for all . Because a policy of no redistribution
is incentive compatible, we can simplify the Tax Design Problem to choosing a vector of taxes subject to







































In the laissez faire,  =  and each agent sets  =  as discussed in the setup of the model. For the












neutralizes preferences’ eﬀects on redistribution. Note that any multiple of this vector would work as well.
























w h e r ew ec a ni m p l e m e n tP r e f e r e n c eN e u t r a l i t ya sd e ﬁn e di nt h et e x tb yc h o o s i n g
 =
( − 1)
( +  − 1)

In general,  can be varied to adjust the cardinalization of preferences in the social welfare function.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
To derive result (21), start with expression (9) to derive the marginal rate of substitution for individual 
















Diﬀerentiating with respect to  gives:















In words, the conventional assumption is that all individuals place the same marginal value on consumption





so that 0 implies that individuals with higher  are less willing to work in order to increase their
consumption than are individuals with lower . To connect this result to income earned, use expression
(14) which shows that the value of  is immaterial to individual ’s choice of earnings, given a tax system




( +  − 1)(1 − )
(+−1)−1
 ( +( 1− ))
−
 (1 − )(1− )
(+−1)
 ( +( 1− ))
−−1 +(  − 1)()
−2  0 if 1 (32)
Result (32) implies that an individual with higher  will choose to earn more income than an individual
with lower . Combining results (31) and (32) yields the relationship described in the proposition.
26Responses to World Values Survey question on preferences

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A1: Distribution of responses within each country
Most of these distributions are centered away from the extreme values, suggesting that truncation is not
a major concern. Even those with substantial mass at the extremes, i.e., Korea and Mexico, have sizable
proportions of respondents at all values.
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